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Turkey’s Membership Application: Implications for the EU 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
Turkey applied for EU membership in 1987: that is, three years before Cyprus and Malta 
and between seven and nine years before applications were lodged by ten Central and 
Eastern European countries (CEECs). Yet, when all but two of the post-Turkey applicants 
became EU members in May 2004, membership negotiations not only had yet to be 
opened with Turkey but they had not even been definitely promised.  
  
For a number of reasons, the Turkish application has not been viewed by the EU 
in the same way as other applications. Rather, it has been seen as being especially and 
distinctively problematical. This has been partly because it has been thought Turkish 
membership will create a number of particular difficulties for the EU and partly because 
Turkey as a country has been regarded - much more so than have other EU applicant 
states - as being very ‘different’ from the EU ‘mainstream’. 
 
This paper focuses on the Turkish application, and more especially on its 
implications for the EU. The paper does not attempt to examine specific policy and 
institutional implications of Turkish membership in detail. Those who want such an 
examination should consult the European Commission’s October 2004 working 
document Issues Arising From Turkey’s Membership Perspective (European Commission 
2004c). Rather, the paper seeks to explain how the EU’s position on the Turkish 
application has reached its current position and to provide an overview of the challenges 
the prospect of Turkish membership poses for the EU. A main conclusion of the paper is 
that although the Turkish application clearly does provide major challenges for the EU, 
both in terms of managing the accession process and then membership itself, there is 
every reason to suppose that it can be handled successfully. A key reason for taking this 
view is the changes that can be expected to occur in both Turkey and the EU in the years 
before accession takes place.  
  
The Background to the Present Situation 
 
Although the EU has been reluctant to open accession negotiations with Turkey, it has 
long been anxious to maintain good relations with it. Accordingly, the strategy of dealing 
with Turkey’s desire for membership has, until recently, been to establish as close 
relations with it as possible - short of opening accession negotiations. 
  
A base to conduct relations in this way existed from 1963, when an association 
agreement was contracted between the EEC and Turkey. The agreement included a range 
of trade, aid, and cultural and political cooperation provisions. It also contained a 
membership perspective, but one that was phrased only in very general terms and with no 
schedule attached.   2
In 1995, as part of the strategy of moving closer to Turkey but not offering 
membership, agreement was reached on concluding the customs union that had been 
foreseen originally in 1963 but which had not been given effect - largely because of 
concerns in EC/EU states over Turkey’s democratic credentials and poor record on 
human rights. In all probability the customs union would not have satisfied Turkey in the 
long term, but it the event it did not do so in the short term either. A key reason for this 
was the faster track onto which post-Turkey membership applicants were placed in 1997. 
On the basis of recommendations made by the Commission in its Agenda 2000 document 
(European Commission, 1997), the European Council at its December 1997 meeting in 
Luxembourg decided that membership applications would open with Cyprus and five 
CEECs in March 1998 and would do so with the other CEEC applicants as soon as they 
were ready (except for Malta, which had suspended its application). There were thus to 
be two enlargement ‘waves’. But Turkey was deemed ineligible to be considered even for 
the second wave. An attempt was made to head-off possible Turkish adverse reaction by 
emphasizing that it was eligible in principle for accession, that it would be judged on the 
basis of the same criteria as other applicants, and that the EU would draw up a strategy to 
prepare it for accession (European Council, 1997: 11-12). But as compared with what the 
other applicant states were being offered, this was very much second best. 
 
Indeed, the second best status was emphasized in a manner Turkey found to be 
positively insulting by the decision of the Luxembourg summit to create a new European 
gathering – to be called The European Conference – which would bring together on an 
annual basis the leaders of EU states and all applicant states including Turkey. The 
Conference was clearly designed with little purpose other than to offer comfort to 
Turkey.    
 
Before long the Luxembourg position on Turkey was being seen as having been 
mistaken. It came, indeed, to be seen as posing a possible fundamental breach in relations 
between the EU and Turkey. This was because the decision to keep Turkey waiting yet 
longer, without any promise of a future review of the decision, let alone a possible date 
when negotiations might open, produced angry reactions from the Turkish government 
and other Turkish elites about how Turkey was being treated. Moreover, hints began to 
emanate from Turkey that it might be forced to look elsewhere for friends. 
 
Accordingly, the line towards Turkey was revised at the December 1999 Helsinki 
summit, with Turkey being accorded the status of a ‘candidate country’
(1). This accord 
was partly symbolic, but it had substance too in that the language concerning Turkey’s 
prospect of eventual membership was made generally more encouraging and specific 
provision was made for a pre-accession strategy embracing an accession partnership 
(European Council, 1999: 3). Subsequently, an accession partnership designed to assist 
Turkey to make the changes required so as to enable it to meet EU’s accession eligibility 
conditions - the Copenhagen criteria - was adopted by the Council of Ministers in March 
2001. The priorities identified in the partnership were then reflected in Turkey’s own 
National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis which was adopted, also in March 
2001, by the Turkish government.   3
  In 2000-01, the EU-15 looked increasingly likely to meet the target of concluding 
the accession negotiations with most of the CEEC and Mediterranean applicant states by 
the December 2002 Copenhagen European Council meeting. It also continued to ‘ratchet 
up’ its language on Turkey’s prospects of accession negotiations. At the December 2001 
Laeken summit, for example, it was declared that ‘Turkey’s progress towards complying 
with the political criteria for accession….has brought forward the prospect of the opening 
of negotiations with Turkey’ (European Council, 2001: 3). 
 
As the crucial Copenhagen summit approached, pressure on the EU to give 
Turkey a date for the opening of accession negotiations intensified. One source of 
pressure stemmed from the Turkish case being strengthened by recent reforms to the 
Turkish constitution and changes to domestic political and administrative practices 
designed to improve Turkey’s credibility under the democratic and human rights 
dimensions of the Copenhagen criteria. Another source was the overwhelming victory of 
an Islamic party - the Justice and Development Party (AKP) – in the Turkish general 
election of November 2002. The new government quickly made clear that it was as 
resolved as its seemingly more pro-western predecessors had been to seek a date for the 
early opening of accession negotiations. 
 
At Copenhagen, the leaders of the EU-15 did not quite meet Turkey’s demands to 
set a definite date for the opening of accession negotiations, but came much closer to 
doing so than had been anticipated. The leaders declared that ‘If the European Council in 
December 2004, on the basis of a report and recommendation for the Commission, 
decides that Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria, the European Union will 
open accession negotiations without delay’ (European Council, 2002: 5). 
 
Although it was not laid down as an explicit condition by the EU leaders at their 
December 2002 meeting, it was made clear to Turkey - through both informal channels 
and public statements by some EU leaders - that even if the Copenhagen political criteria 
were met, the December 2004 European Council would be extremely unlikely to approve 
the opening of accession negotiations unless in the intervening period Turkey was seen to 
have done what it could to help resolve the Cyprus Problem. (Cyprus has been physically 
divided into Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot areas since an invasion of the northern 
part of the island by Turkey in 1974. Some 35,000 Turkish troops are based in northern 
Cyprus.) These ‘warnings’ were issued partly on the basis of political choice by those 
who sympathized with the Greek Cypriot position and/or did not wish to see the EU 
import a potential security problem, and partly on the basis of a recognition of political 
realities: it was anticipated that the government of the Republic of Cyprus would be 
represented in the European Council by December 2004, and it would be likely to 
exercise a veto on the opening of accession negotiations if Turkey continued to support 
and underpin the division of the country. In November 2003, the Commission, in its first 
post-Copenhagen annual report on the progress towards accession being made by Turkey, 
went further than it ever had before in linking the Cyprus Problem to Turkey’s prospect 
of EU membership. The Commission stated that Turkey ‘should provide determined 
support for efforts to achieve a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem’ 
(European Commission, 2003a: 45) The overall strategy paper on enlargement that was   4
issued alongside the report on Turkey and reports on the other acceding and applicant 
countries was even clearer in emphasizing the importance of Turkey becoming 
proactively involved in promoting a settlement: ‘The Commission considers that there are 
favorable conditions for the two communities to reach a comprehensive settlement of the 
Cyprus problem before Cyprus’ accession to the EU on 1 May 2004. The absence of a 
settlement could become a serious obstacle to Turkey’s EU aspirations’ (European 
Commission, 2003b: 16)  
 
In the period between the December 2002 and December 2004 summits, several 
leading EU practitioners - including national leaders - made clear their reservations about 
proceeding with the Turkish application. For example, the President of the Constitutional 
Convention - the body which largely drafted the EU’s Constitutional Treaty - Valery 
Giscard D’Estaing, warned that Turkish accession would be ‘the end of Europe’ (The 
Times, September 23, 2004: 34) and  ‘would change the nature of the European project’ 
(EUobserver, 26 November 2004). In even more dramatic language, the (outgoing) 
European Commissioner for the Internal Market, the Dutchman Frits Bolkestein, warned 
of the ‘Islamisation of Europe’ and pronounced that should Turkey become an EU 
member ‘The relief of Vienna in 1683 [by a Catholic army from an Ottoman siege] will 
have been in vain’ (The Guardian, 22 September, 2004: 17).President Chirac of France 
attempted to canvass support for a privileged partnership between the EU and Turkey 
rather than Turkish EU membership - an idea that was also floated by Giscard D’Estaing 
and by the outgoing Austrian Commissioner for Agriculture, Franz Fischler (European 
Voice, 16-22 September:7; EUoberver, 26 November 2004). 
 
The Turkish government was not deflected in its resolution by such open 
expressions of concern and doubt from within the EU. The idea of a privileged 
partnership was, for example, flatly rejected by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. 
Turkey’s position remained to press ahead with making sure that in December 2004 the 
EU leaders would have little option but to give a date for the opening of accession 
negotiations. 
 
As part of this pressing ahead, Turkey duly ‘fell into line’ on Cyprus, by – 
successfully - urging Turkish Cypriots to support the April 2004 referendum in northern 
Cyprus on the Annan Plan for re-unification of the island. Re-unification did not 
subsequently occur, but this was because in a parallel referendum Greek Cypriots voted 
against the Annan Plan. In consequence, the main responsibility for the continuing 
division of Cyprus was now seen to rest in the eyes of all EU-25 states - apart, of course, 
from the Republic of Cyprus itself - with the Greek Cypriots rather than with Turkey and 
the Turkish Cypriots. 
 
As for the formal membership criteria, including the troublesome political criteria, 
in October 2004 the Commission duly presented documentation for the leaders to be able 
to take a decision at their December summit. The documentation was issued in three 
forms: the required recommendation (European Commission, 2004a); the annual Progress 
Report (European Commission, 2004b); and a paper reviewing issues arising from 
Turkey’s membership perspective (European Commission, 2004c). The recommendation   5
said that Turkey virtually did now meet the Copenhagen criteria, so the opening of 
accession negotiations was recommended. However, no opening date was specified, and - 
conscious of concerns in several member states about the implications for the EU of 
Turkish membership - the Commission advised that the negotiations be conducted on the 
basis of stricter terms that had been imposed on any previous candidate state (see below 
for more on this). The December 2004 summit subsequently accepted the Commission’s 
recommendation and resolved that negotiations be opened in October 2005, subject to 
certain conditions. The conditions were agreed only after difficult and tense exchanges - 
mostly outside formal summit sessions, in which Turkey was able to insert itself as a 
negotiator - over how tough the requirements on Turkey should be and also over Cyprus’s 
insistence that Turkey must give the Republic of Cyprus full recognition. The two main 
sets of conditions concerned measures to ensure progress would continue with the 
Turkish reform programme and a requirement that Turkey give implicit recognition to the 
Republic of Cyprus by signing an updated customs union agreement with all twenty five 
EU states (European Council, 2004: 4-6). (See Ludlow, 2005, for an account of the 
December summit’s handling of the Turkish question.)  
 
The Perceived Negative Implications of Turkish Membership  
 
Why has the Turkish application been, and why is it still, so problematical from the EU’s 
viewpoint? Why have EU member states so lacked enthusiasm for Turkish membership? 
The answer to these questions is complex, with a number of specific reasons combining 
in the explanation. The reasons can be split between those that can be described as being 
formal and those that are more informal.   
 
Formal reasons 
 
Because of the sensitivities involved, the EU has preferred to explain its position in terms 
of formal reasons. These were initially given in the Commission’s 1989 Opinion on the 
application and since 1998 have reiterated in the Commission’s annual reports on 
progress towards accession. 
 
Prior to the June 1993 Copenhagen meeting of the European Council, all that 
existed in terms of formal conditions was the very open Article 237 of the EEC Treaty 
which stated ‘Any European State may apply to become a member of the 
Community…..The conditions of admission and the adjustment to the Treaty necessitated 
thereby shall be the subject of an agreement between the Member States and the applicant 
State’. Turkey’s position as a European state was never openly questioned, but the EC 
still made it clear that no agreement on membership would be possible in the foreseeable 
future. This was stated as being primarily because an unwritten condition of EC accession 
was that only democratic states based on the rule of law could join, and in Turkey 
democracy was fragile and there was a lack of respect for human rights.  
 
At the 1993 Copenhagen summit, EU national leaders agreed – with membership 
applications from CEECs pending – to formally lay down more specific conditions that 
countries aspiring to membership would have to meet. The Copenhagen conditions – or   6
criteria as they came to be known – were designed partly to ensure there would not be too 
much of a gap between the political and economic systems of existing and new member 
states. They were designed also so that existing member states could satisfy themselves 
that new members would respect and be able to adopt Union laws and policies – the so-
called acquis. The key paragraph setting out the Copenhagen criteria stated: 
  
Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of 
institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and 
respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning 
market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure 
and market forces within the Union. Membership presupposes the 
candidate’s ability to take on the obligations of membership including 
adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union. (European 
Council, 1993: 12). 
 
From June 1993, the formal reasons given to Turkey for not activating its 
membership application with the opening of accession negotiations amounted to saying 
that it did meet the Copenhagen criteria. In very recent times, as the EU has gradually 
moved towards the opening of accession negotiations, the Commission’s, and more 
broadly the EU’s, expressed reservations about Turkey and the Copenhagen criteria have 
gradually been toned down. The general line has become that Turkey has made great 
strides towards meeting the political and economic aspects of the criteria, but there 
remain important areas where further progress is necessary. Regarding the political 
criteria, Turkey’s record on human rights has been criticized, especially in relation to the 
treatment of Turkish Kurds, and concerns have been expressed about aspects of the 
functioning of Turkish democracy, including the political role of the military. Regarding 
the economic criteria, Turkey’s economy has been recognized as being based primarily 
on market principles, but there have been concerns that in important respects it is an 
economy that remains fragile. It was, after all, only in 2001 that a major economic crisis 
saw plunging economic growth in Turkey, rampant inflation, and the need of a $16 billion 
loan from the International Monetary Fund. The EU had advised Turkey that further 
liberalization and modernization are required before its economy can meet the rules of, 
and be able to compete in, the internal market.   
 
Informal reasons 
 
But behind the formal reasons for the skepticism, reservations, and - in the case of some 
member states - strong opposition to Turkish membership, have lurked a number of other 
reasons. These have been less formal, and certainly less openly expressed, but they have 
been strongly felt in some quarters. Occasionally there have been attempts to link some 
of these reasons to the Copenhagen conditions that applicants must meet. Occasionally 
too the reasons have been linked to the fourth, often forgotten, Copenhagen criteria for 
EU expansion: ‘The Union’s capacity to absorb new members, while maintaining the 
momentum of European integration, is also an important consideration in the general 
interest of both the Union and the candidate countries’ (European Council, 1993: 12). 
More often than not, however, the reasons have been considered and discussed only in   7
private, and given only rare public outings. What then are these informal, or unofficial, 
reasons for the EU having been, and still being, so hesitant and doubtful about admitting 
Turkey? They usually stem from one, or more commonly several, of the following key 
features of Turkey:    
 
Size. Turkey currently has a population of 70 million, which is projected to 
increase to 100 million by about 2020. By the time of its admission it may have 
surpassed its current position of being second only to Germany of the EU-25 in 
population size and be the largest EU member state.  
 
Level of economic development. Turkey is a significantly poorer country than any 
of the ten states which joined the EU in May 2004 and is also poorer than 
Bulgaria and Romania which are scheduled to join in 2007. Despite its current 
population accounting for 15 per cent of the EU-25 population, its GDP is 
equivalent to just 2 per cent of the EU-25 GDP.  Its GDP per capita is 28.5 per 
cent of the EU-25 GDP (European Commission, 2004c: 13).  
 
Geographical location. Most of Turkey is located geographically in Asia and has 
long borders with states that are, or potentially are, unstable and/or hostile to the 
EU. These states are located in the southern Caucacus (Armenia, Georgia, and 
Azerbaijan) and the Middle East (Iran, Iraq, and Syria).  
 
Islamism. Turkey is overwhelmingly an Islamic country, albeit one with a secular 
state structure. Turkish membership would increase the EU’s Islamic population 
from its current 3 per cent to around 20 per cent.  
 
The cumulative effect of these features has been such as to produce a widely 
shared concern that has been, and still is, widespread amongst existing EU states, 
especially EU-15 states, that Turkey poses not just a challenge but a threat to the EU as it 
now is. As Table 1 shows, most EU-25 states are no better than neutral, and several are 
negative, towards Turkish membership. 
 
The nature of the threat that Turkey is widely held to pose is seen as taking 
different forms. For example, Turkish accession clearly will impact on EU institutions 
and decision making processes. The Commission will perhaps not be overly affected, but 
existing member states’ presence in the Council and the EP most certainly will be, with 
larger and medium-sized states in particular losing presence and voting strengths.   
 
Another dimension to the perceived threat is that the combined effect of Turkey’s 
size, economic underdevelopment and economic structure are likely to result in it being a 
major beneficiary of EU funding Programmes on accession, thus creating budgetary 
problems. Naturally, so far in advance of Turkey’s possible entry, estimates of the 
budgetary implications are necessarily extremely hazy. Much depends on the extent to 
which existing EU ‘spending policies’ remain in their present form, the levels of 
economic growth in Turkey, and the time periods over which Turkey becomes a 
beneficiary of the spending policies – there is a ten year phase-in period in the case of the   8
EU-10 states (the states which became members in May 2004) and the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP). Certainly, however, if major changes from the present state of 
affairs do not occur and if extended phase-in periods are not agreed, then the budgetary 
implications are very considerable, with Turkey set to become a major recipient of EU 
funding. To take the two major areas of EU funding, the CAP and cohesion policy: 
agriculture currently accounts for just over one third of Turkey’s labor force, while 
agricultural output generates 12.2 per cent of GDP (the corresponding figures for the EU-
25 are 5 per cent and 2.2 per cent); the whole of Turkey would currently qualify for 
Objective 1 Structural Fund support (that is, throughout the country the GDP per capita is 
below 75 per cent of the EU average). As an indication of the scale of the budgetary 
issues that have to be addressed in respect of Turkey, the Commission has estimated that, 
on the basis of the existing acquis and assuming there is a ten year phasing-in of direct 
payments, Turkish membership could cost about €30 billion per annum at 2004 prices 
(European Commission, 2004: 46-7). This is equivalent to about one quarter of the 
current budget! 
 
Of course, the nature and extent of the concerns of individual EU-25 governments 
on the particular implications of Turkish membership varies according to national 
circumstances and political choices. For the German government, for example, key 
considerations include: persisting high levels of domestic unemployment; fears that 
Germany will be the main intended country of domicile of Turks wishing to take 
advantage of free movement of labor (a fear based largely on the fact that around 2 
million of the 3. 8 million Turkish migrants who are thought to be currently resident in 
the EU are in Germany); apprehensions that Turkish membership will impose further 
pressures on the EU’s budget (Germany remains by far the largest net contributor to the 
EU budget); and a concern that allowing Turkey to join will further undermine Europe’s 
predominantly Christian inheritance and identity (a concern that is expressed even more 
strongly by the opposition CDU/CSU, which is openly against Turkish membership.) 
 
Concerns of governments are reflected in public concerns. Across the EU as 
whole, public opinion polls show an average of about 35 per cent of people being in favor 
of Turkish membership, about 25 per cent being against, and about 40 per cent being 
unsure. In a few states there are actually large majorities against: by as much as 2: 1 in 
Austria, France and Germany. It is no coincidence that in two of these states - France and 
Austria – the governments have sought to reassure their populations, and perhaps also 
make it more difficult for Turkey to join, by promising national referendums on Turkish 
accession if membership negotiations are completed. (An additional consideration in the 
French case has been a hope that the promise of a referendum on Turkish membership 
will help avoid the issue featuring significantly in the referendum on the Constitutional 
Treaty.)  
 
At political elite levels, the main concerns and opposition stem primarily from 
centre right parties (especially those in the Christian Democratic tradition), strongly pro-
integration parties, and far right parties. The concerns of each of these groups are clear 
enough. For the Christian Democrats, it is as described above with the CDU/CSU: 
weakening Europe’s Christian inheritance and identity. For pro-integrationists (who   9
overlap with the Christian Democrats), it is the perceived potential harmful implications 
for such things as the smooth functioning of EU decision-making processes, the further 
development of the EU policy agenda, and the nature of European consciousness and 
identity. And for the far right, it is a melange of matters related mainly to resistance to the 
integration process as a whole, sovereignty concerns, and ethnicity considerations.  
 
 It was significant that when the EP held a vote in December 2004 on whether or 
not to open accession negotiations with Turkey, the vote was held by secret ballot at the 
insistence of the centre right European People’s Party (the largest party in the 
Parliament). In the vote, 407 voted for, 262 against, and there were 29 abstentions. There 
was little doubt from where most of the opposition votes against came.  
 
The Perceived Positive Implications of Turkish Membership 
 
The potential benefits for Turkey of EU membership are clear. They include better access 
to the EU market, improved prospects for inward investment, more financial aid, and 
participation in an extremely and increasingly important global political and economic 
power. 
 
But the potential benefits for the EU are less clear, or at least are less recognized 
amidst the negativity of most of the discussions on the implications for the EU of Turkish 
membership. However, potential benefits do exist. They accrue primarily from:  
 
The size of the Turkish market. Turkey’s 70 million – and rapidly growing – 
population means that it is a large market. Currently, it is the EU’s sixth largest 
trading partner. The EU-Turkey customs union means that there already exists 
reasonably open trade between the two, but barriers and obstacles that remain 
should gradually be removed as membership approaches. Amongst these barriers 
are a largely closed financial services sector and a distinctive framework of 
corporate law and structures. 
 
The nature of Turkey’s labor market.  Turkey has a much younger workforce than 
the EU-25 and a much faster growing workforce given its high birth rates. 
According to Commission projections, the EU-25’s total population will increase 
by just 2% (458 million to 449 million) between 2005 and 2025, with its working 
age population falling by 21 million. From 2005 to 2030, the number of people 
over 65 will rise by 52.3 % while the 15-64 age group will decrease by 6.8%, 
resulting in the ratio of dependent young and old people to people of working age 
increasing from 49% in 2005 to 66% in 2030 (European Commission, 2005). 
Movement of labor from Turkey to other EU states could thus be vital both to 
provide working personnel and to help maintain welfare systems which could be 
under severe pressures.   
 
Turkey’s Islamism. Whilst this is viewed by many in negative terms - often 
because it is seen as heralding the end of any prospect of the EU being based on a   
shared sense of identity - it can be viewed in a positive light too. The UK  10
government, for example, has based much of its public justification for supporting 
Turkey on the grounds of a real opportunity existing of embracing an Islamic 
country that is looking westwards.  Might not, many proponents of Turkish 
membership ask, a moderate Islamic country inside the EU serve to demonstrate 
that Islam, democracy, and western capitalism can mix, to  encourage moderate 
Islamism, and to help extend the EU’s ‘soft’ influence in other Islamic countries 
with which it wishes to have better relations?  
 
Turkey’s strategic political and security position. Turkey occupies a key geo-
political position. It is physically located close to, and has considerable influence 
in, the Balkans, the Middle East, the Eastern Mediterranean, and several states of 
the former Soviet Union. A stable Turkey within the EU could have a stabilizing 
influence within this conflict-prone neighborhood. 
 
At the same time as being located next to politically unstable areas, 
Turkey is a member of virtually all of the major western and European 
organizations, with the exception of the EU: the Council of Europe, the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and – most importantly of 
all - the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). As such Turkey already is, 
and as an EU member would have even greater potential to be, an important 
bridge between the West and countries currently on the margins of Western 
influence.     
 
Why is the EU Proceeding Towards (Probable) Turkish Membership? 
 
Given the problems and difficulties the Turkish application is widely seen as creating for 
the EU, why are EU decision-makers proceeding with it?  
 
There are, broadly speaking, three types of explanation for the decision to open 
accession negotiations. All are significant for our purposes here because all suggest that 
the decision is being taken not on wholly cost-benefit grounds. That is to say, it is not 
being taken on the basis of all, or even most, decision-makers firmly believing that the 
benefits for the EU will outweigh the difficulties. On the contrary, indeed, the 
governments of virtually all existing EU member states harbor at least considerable 
reservations about the implications of the decision, and some are (not so) privately 
opposed to it.   
 
The three explanations - which are best viewed as complementing, rather than as 
competing against, one another – see the decision as being a consequence of three 
different sorts of factors: 
 
Political pressures 
 
EU decision-makers have long been pressurized from various quarters to accept the 
Turkish application. The most obvious of these quarters has, of course, been Turkey itself  11
which, despite the clear reservations, doubts, and even opposition on the EU side, has just 
refused to give up on its ambitions for membership. As long as the Turkish reaction to 
rebuffs was confined to disappointment, EU governments did not become overly 
concerned. This situation changed, however, after the EU decided in 1997 to offer a 
foreseeable membership perspective to all applicants except Turkey. It changed because 
Turkish leaders reacted to the decision with anger and with statements and comments to 
the effect that Turkey might have to start looking more seriously to its east and south for 
allies. This resulted in many EU leaders coming to view the 1997 decision as having been 
over-dismissive, and indeed as being potentially dangerous if Turkey started to edge away 
from the EU.  
  
This possibility of Turkey edging away also played a part in stiffening the pressures being 
exerted on EU decision-makers from other political actors. Turkey has never benefited 
from having a strong ‘patron’ or ‘sponsor’ of its case amongst existing EU members, in 
the way in which during the lead-up to the May 2004 enlargement some ‘problem 
countries’ did so benefit: Germany’s strong support for Poland, for example, or Greece’s 
support for Cyprus. But Turkey has, nonetheless, had ‘friends’ in EU circles, which have 
played an important role in supporting its case. Within the EU itself, the most important 
of these friends have been the UK on the one hand and – in recent times - Greece on the 
other. UK support has been important because of the UK’s position as one of the EU’s 
large states, whilst Greek support has had considerable symbolic significance because of 
the traditional enmity between Greece and Turkey. Outside the EU, the US – which for 
geo-strategic reasons has long been close to Turkey in western power circles – has acted 
virtually as a sponsor of the Turkish case. Indeed, on the eve of the crucial December 
2002 Copenhagen summit, President Bush even telephoned the summit’s chair, Danish 
Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen, to stress the strategic importance of Turkey 
(European Voice, 12-18 December 2002), and after an EU-US Summit in June 2004 he 
told a press conference ‘As Turkey meets the EU standards of membership, the European 
Union should begin talks that will lead to full membership for the republic of Turkey) 
EUobserver, 27 June 2004).. 
 
Rational calculations 
 
Most, but certainly not all, EU decision-makers would appear to believe privately that in 
terms of the factors that have to be considered when evaluating the likely consequences 
for the EU of Turkish membership, the overall balance sheet is in the red rather than the 
black. That there are potential benefits as well as potential costs of Turkish membership 
is widely recognized, but the latter are seen generally as being more significant than the 
former. Surely, then, the rational course of action for the EU would have been to attempt 
to continue with the policy of staying close to Turkey and cooperating with it on many 
fronts, but to refuse to open accession negotiations? 
  
The fact that this is not the course of action chosen testifies to the limited use of 
rational decision making models when trying to explain the EU’s position on Turkey. 
Such models rely on the decision maker being able to identify goals, recognize the 
alternative possible ways of achieving the goals, and then weighing the advantages and  12
disadvantages of the alternatives in a neutral manner. But in the EU there are numerous 
actors involved in decision making processes, and on Turkey they have different aims. 
This means there is no commonly agreed goal on the EU’s future relations with Turkey, 
other than for them to be peaceful and for trade between the two to grow. In turn, this 
means the decision making process on Turkey’s wish for membership cannot be a 
consequence of EU decision makers collectively choosing the best course of action to 
achieve an agreed goal on the basis of a careful weighing of the options available.  
 
This is not, of course, to suggest that the preferences of individual EU actors 
cannot be partly explained in rational decision making terms. Take the case, for example, 
of the UK, which has long been a firm supporter of the Turkish application. This support 
has been given not because of a judgment that Turkish membership will create few 
difficulties but rather, in part at least, precisely because it is thought that it will do so. In 
particular, the very fact that Turkey is so different is seen as assisting the UK in its goal 
of ensuring that the EU remains relatively loose in organizational terms and does not drift 
further in a federal direction. On this basis, the UK’s position is fully understandable in 
rational decision making terms.  
 
The UK case shows how the presence of rationality as an explanatory concept in 
helping to explain the decision to move towards the opening of accession negotiations 
with Turkey is best seen by disaggregating the different rationalities of the various actors. 
When this is done, one can readily recognize why governments that are strong supporters 
of a more integrated Europe have considerable reservations about admitting Turkey, and 
why governments that wish to see the integration process slowed and believe Turkish 
admission will contribute to this by making the EU more difficult to manage view 
Turkish admission more favorably. One can readily recognize too why some governments 
with reservations are prepared to be flexible because they believe the situations of both 
Turkey and the EU will be sufficiently transformed by the time admittance eventually 
occurs (more on this below). 
 
Values and unfolding rhetorical entrapment 
 
There is an extensive body of literature testifying to how the decision to enlarge the EU 
to Central and Eastern European countries is best viewed not in pressure politics or 
rational terms but rather in sociological/constructivist terms (see, for example, 
Schimmelfennig, 2001 and 2002). Such an approach can also be extended to the Turkish 
application 
(2). 
 
The essence of this view as applied to the CEECs is that whilst it was always 
recognized by the EU-15 that the admission of CEECs to the EU would indeed bring 
some benefits to the latter, the overall cost-benefit balance sheet was by no means clearly 
in the black, and for some individual EU states was likely to be in the red. Moreover, 
beyond measurable likely consequences of enlargement – found in economic indicators – 
there were a number of immeasurable possible consequences suggesting real dangers for 
the EU: for example, severe disruption of institutional functioning and security problems 
arising from freer movement of peoples. A decision on the CEEC applications based on  13
wholly rational grounds would, therefore, constructivist have argued, have resulted in 
rejections. 
 
How, therefore, do constructivists explain the enlargement to the CEECs? 
Specific positions vary, but in broad terms the main thrust of the explanation is found in 
social identities, norms and values. For Schimmelfennig (2001), a key part of the 
explanation for why the admittance of CEECs was granted is found in ‘rhetorical action’, 
which describes how actors come ‘to focus on their collective identity and honor their 
obligations as community members’ (p. 63). In the EU context, the collective identity and 
the obligations are seen by Schimmelfennig as involving a commitment to the integration 
of all liberal European states. As soon as some EU-15 states (for quite rational reasons) 
began to press for enlargement to CEECs, other – less enthusiastic – states became swept 
up in a rhetorical commitment, which led to a ‘rhetorical entrapment’ involving a process 
of virtual drift toward a policy commitment they did not at heart support. ‘By 
argumentatively “entrapping” the opponents of a firm commitment to Eastern 
enlargement, they [the supporters of enlargement] brought about a collective outcome 
that would not have been expected given the constellation of powers and interests’ (p.77). 
 
Sjursen (2002) is similarly persuaded of the importance of values in explaining 
the enlargement to CEECs, but for her the key values were  not so much ones of liberal-
democratic political rectitude but more ones of ‘kinship-based duty’ (p. 508). On this 
basis, the 2004 enlargement is to be understood, in part at least, in terms of the existence 
of a community-based identity ‘that drives enlargement towards Eastern Europe and 
motivates the EU to accept its costs. It shows that the decision on enlargement is the 
result of an understanding of who the Europeans are and what it means to be European’ 
(Sjursen: 508). This is not to suggest that the notion of what is European is forever fixed 
and cannot shift. But it is to affirm, as Sjursen puts it, ‘that in order to trigger a decision 
to enlarge, something more than instrumental calculations and something less than a 
selfless concern for human rights has been at play’ (p: 509). 
 
Clearly, similar constructivist explanations can be applied to the Turkish 
application. They can help explain why in the second half of the 1990s and the early 
2000s the EU moved from its preferred policy of being close to Turkey but stopping short 
of holding out the possibility of membership to giving Turkey a foreseeable membership 
perspective. The gradually evolving ‘upgrading’ of language - evidenced in the extracts 
from European Council Conclusions that were given earlier in the paper - produced a 
situation that made it progressively difficult for doubters and opponents to backtrack. But 
the upgrading was gradual and drawn out, which helps to throw light on why the EU has 
been and is much more hesitant towards Turkey than towards the CEECs. For the fact is 
that notions of collective identity and kinship-based duty are by no means as strong in 
respect of Turkey than they were in respect of CEECs. But some such notions – 
emanating in part from shared membership of European and Western organizations and 
in part too from empathy with Turkey’s liberalizing and democratizing reform programs - 
would appear to exist to at least some extent amongst many European governing elites.  
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The Implications of Turkish Membership, Viewed in a Historical Perspective 
 
In the above sections of the paper, many implications of Turkish membership for the EU 
have been identified. Most of these implications are viewed by the majority of the EU-25 
in a negative light, although a few implications are seen as being positive. 
 
That the prospect of Turkish membership should be seen in both positive and 
negative lights is not surprising. After all, leaving specifics of the Turkish case aside for 
the moment, this is how all previous enlargement rounds have been seen by existing 
members, apart from the EFTAn round which was generally viewed as having few 
drawbacks. But the negatives in the Turkish case are seen by many practitioners and 
observers as being particularly acute and as making the Turkish application particularly 
problematical. Two points are worth making about this from a historical perspective.  
 
First, the 1973, the Mediterranean, and the 10 + 2 enlargement rounds were all 
seen at the time as being highly problematical: in the 1973 round, particularly problems 
included British budgetary contributions and Commonwealth preferences; in the 
Mediterranean round, Structural Fund financing and the Common Fisheries Policy 
loomed large; and in the 10 + 2 round, problems included the unprecedented number of 
applicants and the fact that virtually all of them had weak economies and underdeveloped 
political and administrative systems. But notwithstanding these many and varied 
difficulties, the EU rose to the challenges and found solutions. There is no reason to 
suppose it cannot do so again in respect of most of the particular problems posed by 
Turkey. After all, are not resilience and adaptability amongst the EU’s most prominent 
characteristics? 
 
Second, it is inevitable that the more the EU expands beyond its former Western 
European base the more enlargement will become increasingly problematical. The 
‘naturals’ for EU membership, the countries that could be absorbed with relative ease, are 
now virtually all members. (The exceptions are Norway, Switzerland and Iceland.) The 
further east and south the enlargement path is taken, the more the EU will encounter 
problems of under-developed economies, fragile democracies, weak administrative and 
legal systems, and variations on ‘Europeanness’. But unless the EU’s ultimate boundaries 
are to be defined in some definitive manner, these are problems that will have to be 
tackled for some considerable time to come. For there is no sign as yet that applications 
will dry up. Far from it indeed: two of the states of the former Yugoslavia have already 
applied (Croatia and Macedonia) and other applications from the Balkans can be 
expected in due course; and it is most unlikely that the European Neighborhood Policy 
will succeed in its aim of deterring applications from the likes of Moldova and the 
Ukraine.  
 
Implications of Turkish Membership, Viewed in a Future Perspective 
 
Overall, the balance sheet of the positives and negatives of future Turkish membership of 
the EU is seen by most policy practitioners as currently being in deficit. However, there 
are reasons for thinking that by the time Turkey becomes a member – and 2015 is  15
generally recognized as being the earliest possible year by which this will be possible – 
the situation will have changed considerably. There are two main reasons for this: internal 
changes in Turkey and the EU, and the conduct of the accession negotiations.  
 
Internal changes in Turkey and the EU  
  
Many of the projections on the implications of Turkey becoming an EU member are 
arguably too rooted in Turkey and the EU as they are now rather than as they are likely to 
be when membership is attained. If, however, projections are made on the basis of what 
both ‘sides’ may look like by the time of the accession, then some of the difficulties are 
likely to, if not to have completely withered, at least to be less problematical and 
challenging. 
  
This point may be illustrated by taking two key features of the integration process 
– Europeanization and increased flexibility - and demonstrating how one is already 
bringing about a significantly different Turkey and the other a significantly different EU. 
 
Europeanization. This word is used in various ways, but is generally understood 
as the process by which the influence of the EU is increasingly penetrating into domestic 
affairs. More particularly, Europeanization normally refers specifically to the ways in 
which the political, administrative and legal systems of the EU’s member states and the 
behavior and actions of the policy practitioners of the states are shaped and conditioned 
by the EU. Europeanization does not necessarily imply an emerging uniformity of 
national political structures and actions, but it does indicate a growing intertwining 
between the EU and its member states and a significant degree of convergence in some 
areas of activity. (On Europeanization, see, for example: Olsen 2002 and 2003; Radaelli, 
2000.) 
  
A key feature of Europeanization is that although it most obviously and most 
extensively applies to the EU’s member states, it is not restricted to them. So, for 
example, the countries of Western Europe that are not members of the EU have had little 
choice but to incorporate significant parts of the internal market acquis into their national 
law. More forcefully, states that aspire to EU membership are required to Europeanize in 
many ways. Even before accession processes formally begin applicants must meet the 
Copenhagen criteria and generally be able to demonstrate that they can be team players 
on key EU concerns. Once accession processes are launched, they are focused in large 
part around applicants being informed of what they must do to meet the EU’s conditions 
of membership, and then working with the EU - and in particular the Commission - to 
satisfy the requirements. As Heather Grabbe has observed, an accession process ‘is not 
about finding common interests between equal partners. Rather, it is about agreeing a 
timetable for the candidate country to apply the EU’s laws at home’ (2004: 6). 
  
In Turkey, Europeanization is already well under way, largely in response to the 
EU’s stipulations concerning the political dimensions of the Copenhagen conditions. This 
is seen most obviously in the many constitutional and legislative changes that have been 
made since 2001 to align Turkish law with EU values, norms and practices. These  16
changes, many of which are part of new Penal and Civil Codes, include reforms to the 
judicial system, stronger protection and rights for minorities, a greater emphasis on the 
importance of individual liberties, and the abolition of the death penalty. As the accession 
process moves from its current initial stage into the more advanced stages of screening 
and then ‘negotiations’, then so will Europeanization increasingly be ‘imposed’ on 
Turkey as the terms of the negotiating chapters have to be met, as the 80,000 or so pages 
of EU law have to be incorporated into Turkish law, and as Turkey increasingly 
participates in EU programs. 
 
Increased flexibility. As the EU has enlarged over the years, its membership has 
inevitably become more heterogeneous. It has done so both in terms of the objective 
situations of the member states and their political preferences and choices on matters 
ranging from the general nature of the integration process to detailed policy issues. 
  
This growing heterogeneity has raised the possibility of the EU becoming increasingly 
immobilized in terms of its ability to continue to move the integration process forward. 
To ensure such immobilization has not occurred, two broad strategies have been pursued. 
On the one hand, the revisions of the treaties that have been undertaken every five years 
or so since the mid-1980s have made it progressively more difficult for a minority of 
states to veto actions that have majority support. In other words, there has been a 
progressive reduction in the number of the types of decisions that require the unanimous 
approval of the Council and an associated progressive increase in the number that can be 
approved by qualified majority vote. On the other hand, there has been a developing 
willingness to not insist that all member states must swim absolutely abreast on all policy 
matters. That is to say, a more flexible approach has been taken to policy participation. 
 
  This flexibility has taken a number of forms, two of which are especially 
important.  
  
First, there is the open method of co-ordination (OMC), which involves the 
member states agreeing on general policy goals and instruments but leaving most of the 
decisions on detailed policy implementation to national determination. Crucially, OMC is 
not based on legal application but rather on mechanisms such as peer review, ‘shaming’ 
through league tables produced by the Commission, and encouragement of best practice. 
Policy areas in which the OMC is currently being utilized include employment policy, 
several Lisbon Process policies, and – especially for non eurozone states – aspects of 
EMU. Clearly the more the OMC is developed and used, the more will Turkey be able to 
‘slide’ into policy areas that might cause difficulties for both it and the EU if a tight and 
legalistic approach is taken. 
  
Second, there is differentiated, or enhanced, cooperation. This is where policy 
initiatives and actions proceed without all EU member states being fully involved, or 
indeed being involved at all. The most notable examples to date of differentiated 
integration are Schengen, EMU, and the fledgling European Security and Defence Policy 
(ESDP). It seems likely that this list will expand in the future. There are two firm reasons 
for this, and one possible reason:  17
• Differentiation is most likely in policy areas that display certain characteristics, 
and these characteristics have been, and continue to be, increasingly present as the 
EU’s policy portfolio grows. The policy areas include: those that are not directly 
related to the internal market; those that are strategically important for some 
states; those that are of concern only to some states; and those where member 
states favor different regulatory styles (Junge, 2002). 
 
• The Amsterdam Treaty made specific provision for enhanced cooperation and 
the Nice Treaty has made it easier to operationalize. Whereas under the 
Amsterdam provisions ‘at least a majority’ of member states must be involved for 
enhanced cooperation to be able to proceed, under the Nice provisions only a 
‘minimum of eight’ must be so. 
 
• If the Constitutional Treaty is not ratified by any member state or states it is 
likely that more pro-integrationist states will proceed with policy developments in 
specific areas and leave the non ratifiers outside. The notion advanced in some 
Eurosceptic quarters that non ratifications will mean the end of the Treaty is 
probably illusory. Of course, much will depend on which member states do not 
ratify – non ratification by France, for example, will be more damaging for the 
Treaty than non ratification by the Czech Republic. Certainly in the case of the 
state that is seen as being the most likely to not ratify, the UK, it is highly 
probable that non ratification will encourage some member states – probably led 
by France and Germany – to press ahead by themselves with ever closer union in 
some areas. (On the possible consequences of a UK ‘No’, see Grant, 2005) 
 
The more differentiation does develop in the years prior to Turkey’s accession, 
then clearly the greater is the potential for Turkey to become an EU member without 
necessarily involving itself, or at least involving itself fully, in ‘unsuitable’ or ‘difficult’ 
policy areas.  
 
The conduct of the accession process 
 
As was noted above, the requirements of the accession process are such as to make 
extensive Europeanization unavoidable. But in addition to the facilitating impact of 
Europeanization in easing the impact on the EU of Turkish membership, there are also 
other aspects of the accession process that should make the admission of Turkey less 
problematical than it might appear at present. 
  
The most obvious aspect is that the accession process clearly will be extremely 
protracted. There will, therefore, be considerable time for both Turkey and the EU to 
make what are deemed to be the necessary possible   adjustments. (Of course, some 
critics of the decision to open accession negotiations attach importance to matters where 
extensive adjustments will not be possible, or arguably even desirable: identity questions, 
for example, and cultural attitudes.) Indeed, the process will be by far the longest 
accession process in the history of enlargement. In terms of the period between the 
submission of a membership application and accession, Turkey is already well ‘in the  18
lead’ even though membership negotiations have yet to be opened. (The next longest 
periods are the thirteen years and ten months for Cyprus and Malta, followed by the ten 
years and one month for Hungary and Poland.) The existing  longest periods between the 
formal opening of accession negotiations and accession are the seven years and three 
months for Portugal, six years and eleven months for Spain, and the six years and two 
months for the ‘first wave’ CEECs and Cyprus. Assuming the negotiating stage opens 
with Turkey in October 2005, it is unlikely that the negotiations will be completed before 
2013. Indeed, this minimum time period is virtually built into the process, with the 
Commission making it clear that it will not be possible for the negotiations to be 
completed until the EU has agreed on its financial perspective for the period from 2014 
(European Commission, 2004a: 10). And then there is the gap between the closing of the 
negotiations and final ratification, which could be extensive and by no means assured of 
success given the controversial nature of the matter. (The commitment by the Austrian 
and French governments to holding national referendums on Turkish accession may well 
be but the first early sign of major ratification problems.)  
 
Another aspect of the accession process that is likely to ease possible problems 
for the EU is that it is clear the EU will not only take lengthy steps to protect itself but 
also, if necessary, unprecedented steps. This is evident from the Commission’s October 
2004 recommendation on the Turkish application and the December 2004 European 
Council’s Conclusions on the application which were based on the Commission’s 
recommendation (European Commission, 2004a; European Council, 2004). The 
recommendation and Conclusions are studded - in a fashion and to a degree that has not 
been seen with other applicants - with warnings to Turkey about how dependent progress 
is on Turkey continuing on its reformist path. Indeed, the Conclusions explicitly state – 
albeit in a manner less explicitly directed toward Turkey than was the case in the 
Commission’s recommendation - that negotiations may be broken off if there are any 
major reversal in Turkey’s reforms: 
 
In the case of a serious and persistent breach in a candidate state of the principles of 
liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule 
of law on which the Union is founded, the Commission will, on its own initiative or 
on the request of one third of the Member States, recommend the suspension of 
negotiations and propose the conditions for eventual resumption. The Council will 
decided by qualified majority on such a recommendation, after having heard from 
the candidate state, whether to suspend the negotiations and on the conditions for 
their resumption. (European Council, 2004: 8). 
 
The Conclusions also stated - again for the first time in respect of any candidate 
country - that the negotiations ‘are an open-ended process, the outcome of which cannot 
be guaranteed beforehand’ (emphasis added) (p. 7). 
 
And, in yet another breach with precedent, the Conclusions not only anticipated 
the possibility of long transitional periods and derogations in some areas, which are 
common enough, but also stated that ‘permanent safeguard clauses, i.e. clauses which are 
permanently available as a basis for safeguard measures, may be considered. The  19
Commission will include these, as appropriate, in its proposals for each framework, for 
areas such as freedom of movement of persons, structural policies or agriculture’ (p. 7).   
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
The Turkish accession process that is scheduled to formally begin in October 2005 
clearly will be protracted and difficult. It will be so for a combination of reasons, some of 
which are similar to the reasons that made the pre-May 2004 accession processes 
relatively long and some of which arise from the distinctive nature of the Turkish case. 
The similar reasons include the sheer volume of detailed and technical matters that need 
to be covered and the many adaptations that Turkey will have to make - some of which 
will be financially costly - to be able to incorporate the acquis  and to put in place 
administrative systems that will satisfy the EU states. The distinctive reasons stem from 
the wider political, economic religious, and cultural concerns about the Turkish 
application, which are likely to incline those member states that harbor doubts about 
whether the accession membership should be proceeding at all to ensure the accession 
process is taken at a cautious, not to say drawn-out, pace.  
 
  The prospect of Turkish membership does pose an unprecedented challenge for 
the EU and most EU states would - if they were in full control of events - prefer not to be 
proceeding towards probable Turkish accession. But that said, the fact is that Turkey does 
have much to offer the EU. Furthermore, there is every reason to suppose that as both 
Turkey and the EU continue to evolve over the period before Turkey actually assumes 
membership – which is likely to be a minimum of twelve years or so – many of what may 
now seem to be major obstacles will gradually be seen to be less daunting.    
 
 
Endnotes 
1 Parts of this section draw on pp. 39-41 of Nugent (2004). 
2 Parts of this section draw on pp. 7-9 of Nugent (2004) 
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Table 1 
Attitudes of EU-25 governments towards Turkish membership in the period  
leading up to the December 2004 European Council meting 
 
 
Positive 
 
Greece 
Italy 
Spain 
Sweden 
UK 
 
Neutral 
 
Belgium 
Czech Republic 
Estonia 
Finland 
Germany 
Hungary 
Ireland 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Malta 
Poland 
Portugal 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
 
 
Unenthusiastic 
 
France 
Netherlands 
Denmark 
 
Negative 
 
Austria 
Cyprus 
 
  
 
 